Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 4

Summer 2014

Making the Machine Work: Technocratic Engineering of Rights for
Domestic Workers at the International Labour Organization
Leila Kawar
Bowling Green State University, lkawar@legal.umass.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kawar, Leila (2014) "Making the Machine Work: Technocratic Engineering of Rights for Domestic Workers
at the International Labour Organization," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 21 : Iss. 2 , Article
4.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol21/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Making the Machine Work: Technocratic
Engineering of Rights for Domestic Workers
at the International Labour Organization
LEILA KAWAR*
ABSTRACT

In September 2013, the International Labour Organization (ILO)
Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers entered into
force, thereby bringing domestic workers into the mainstream of labor
law. This article explores how the interests of the ILO's constituents were
shaken up and reconfigured to build support for new labor protections
amidst the shifting global context of deregulation. I argue that
technocratic devices-charts,
questionnaires, and
paragraph
formatting-wielded by ILO insiders contributed to this development by
creating epistemic space for this new category of employees to be
recognized and for consensus to be secured on appropriate labor
standardsfor this group. I draw on a pragmatist ethnographic approach
to show how the ILO's lawmaking apparatusmelded technical law and
grassroots activism so as to make domestic worker rights became a legal
reality.
INTRODUCTION

In September 2013, the Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189) and
its supplementing Recommendation (No. 201) entered into force, having
been voted into the corpus of international labor law two years earlier
by the tripartite constituency of the International Labour Organization
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(ILO).1 These international instruments offer legal protections to
workers exposed to exploitation as temporary foreign contract labor who
are disadvantaged by racial and gender hierarchies and. who
traditionally have been excluded from the protections of domestic labor
laws. 2 In the growing number of states that have ratified the ILO
Domestic Workers Convention and its accompanying Recommendation,
these international standards are important because they address longstanding gaps in public policy on this question. 3 While it is still too soon
to know how these standards will be implemented, the enactment of the
Domestic Workers Convention has energized ongoing transnational
mobilizations by and for domestic workers and there are signs that
these standards are guiding reforms in an increasing number of
countries. 4
Moreover, for scholars of global governance, the enactment of these
recent international legal instruments offers a window to examine the
success of an innovative regulatory project at a moment when national
regulatory agencies continue to consider proposals for reducing their
labor market interventions. In this contemporary global context of
deregulation, the Domestic Workers Convention has been heralded as
an instance of regulatory dynamism, insofar as its extension of legal
protections to workers whose "service" had previously been considered a
"status" can be understood as a fundamental reconstruction of

1. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Decent Work for
Domestic Workers, June 16, 2011, ILO No. 189 (entered into force Sept. 5, 2013)
[hereinafter Domestic Workers Convention]; International Labour Organization,
Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, June 16, 2011, ILO No.
201 [hereinafter Recommendation].
2. See generally GRACE CHANG, DISPOSABLE DOMESTICS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN
WORKERS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000); PIERRETTE HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, DOMtSTICA:
IMMIGRANT WORKERS CLEANING AND CARING IN THE SHADOWS OF AFFLUENCE (2001);
SHIRLENA HUANG ET AL., ASIAN WOMEN As TRANSNATIONAL DOMESTIC WORKERS (2005);
.MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. (1992); Ray Jureidini & Nayla Moukarbel, Female Sri
Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Case of 'Contract Slavery'?, 30 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 581 (2004) (providing extra background material on the exploitation of
domestic workers who have traditionally been excluded from national labor protections).
3. See Ratifications of C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f~p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_I
D:2551460 (last visited July 31, 2014), for a list of ratifying states for Convention 189 and
Recommendation 201. The United States is a signatory to these instruments, although it
has not yet ratified them.
4. See Helen Schwenken & Elisabeth Priugl, An ILO Convention for Domestic Workers:
Contextualizing the Debate, 13 INT'L FEMINIST J. POL. 437, 439-40 (2011); Martin Oelz,
The ILO's Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation: A Window of Opportunity
for Social Justice, 153 INT'L LABOUR REV. 143, 167-169 (2014).
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traditional arrangements. 5 As recent studies have shown, the impetus
for the international law-making effort that culminated in the
Convention emerged from a transnational advocacy movement that
focused its efforts on empowering domestic workers.6 Certainly, the
mobilization of domestic worker activists throughout the conventiondrafting process was a crucial factor in the emergence of new
international labor standards and illustrates the practice of governance
at a local scale.
Yet, even with the determined and energetic support of a
transnational mobilization of domestic worker activists, there is reason
to suspect that some additional form of "facilitation" was required to
establish consensus on the substantive terms of reference for
standard-setting in the area of domestic work. It is significant that
Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation resulted from only
four weeks of negotiations, a remarkably brief period from the point of
view of domestic worker advocates familiar with the slow pace of
international lawmaking.7 It is unclear how a law-making body whose
government
and
employer
representatives
expressed
strong
reservations about any new standard-setting initiative came to
agreement and produced a new set of legal understandings on an issue
that had not even been on the radar of mainstream labor policymakers.
In this article, I build on existing accounts of how "Decent Work for
Domestic Workers" became part of contemporary labor law by exploring
Convention and
the enactment
of the Domestic Workers
Recommendation through a theoretical and methodological framework
that draws inspiration from philosopher of science Bruno Latour's
ethnographic studies of the material semiotics of expert knowledgeproduction.8 Applying this approach to the context of legal knowledgeproduction, my analysis takes the entirety of the convention-production
process as a focus and examines this process as an assemblage of
epistemic translations. I argue that, in the case of the Domestic Workers
Convention, these translations were bound together through the
creative deployment of technical devices and legal techniques that
cemented previously unstable normative and empirical assumptions

5. Adelle Blackett, The Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention and
Recommendation, 2011, 106 AM. J. INT'L. L. 778, 780 (2012).
6. Eileen Boris & Jennifer N. Fish, "Slaves No More": Making Global Labor
Standardsfor Domestic Workers, FEMINIST STUD. (forthcoming).
7. Telephone Interview with Ana Avendano, Legal Office, AFL-CIO (Apr. 2012).
8. See generally BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005) (emphasizing the contributions of both human and nonhuman actors in facilitating the process of scientific discovery).
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about domestic work, thereby making it possible to forge international
consensus on how this activity should be governed.
In what follows, I first discuss the theoretical framework used to
interrogate the law-making apparatus at work in the Domestic Workers
Convention and explain the methods and empirical materials engaged
in this study. I then provide two brief background sections, offering
readers who are not familiar with ILO processes a sketch of the lawmaking apparatus of international labor legislation, as well as an
overview of the evolving contemporary political context for labor
regulation. This sets the groundwork for my detailed examination, in
Sections VI and VII, of the procedures involved in defining the project of
standard-setting for domestic workers and in instantiating these
standards within the specific form of Domestic Workers Convention.
This close empirical description of the convention-drafting process is
followed by an analysis section that unpacks how technical devices
wielded by lawyers, economists, and international civil servants within
the ILO facilitated the reorganization of "law" and "society" required for
the instantiation of new governance norms.
I. INTERROGATING THE TECHNIQUES THROUGH WHICH LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE IS MADE

As scholars of governance have rediscovered the importance of legal
techniques and technicalities, they have looked to the field of Science
and Technology Studies (STS), and particularly to the work of Bruno
Latour, for methodological and theoretical guidance. Building on prior
STS scholarship that emphasizes a pragmatist and constructivist
theoretical orientation, Latour elaborates an analytical framework for
empirical study of expert knowledge-production, an approach that he
terms Actor-Network Theory (ANT). According to Latour, ANT can be
distinguished from prior constructivist approaches in the sociology of
science, which in his view has placed undue emphasis on the agentive
powers of political and economic structures and have ignored the
agentive role of objects (tools and technologies) in forging social
relations and social knowledge. 9 As Latour points out, this agentive role
of objects-mediating associations and interactions among human
actors-is particularly apparent in scientific laboratories, since
structuralist explanations of scientific knowledge that ignore the place
of technical innovation are clearly implausible.10 As Latour puts it, it is

9. See id. at 63-86.
10. BRUNO LATOUR, PANDORA'S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES 19
(1999).
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true that scientists master the world, "but only if the world comes to
them in the form of two-dimensional, superposable, combinable
inscriptions."" In other words, if we want to understand scientific
knowledge, we need to look at the techniques and technical devices
deployed in the production of epistemic stability at any given time and
place.
Within the domain of socio-legal scholarship, legal anthropologist
Annelise Riles offers one of the first in-depth explorations of how the
ANT approach might be applied to study the material dimensions of
global governance. Riles painstakingly traces the expert legal practices
associated with the private regulation, through collateral guarantees, of
cross-border financial transactions to investigate the inner logic of this
modality of global governance. 12 Focusing on technical law as an object
of phenomenological and cultural interrogation, Riles moves away from
attempts to "unmask" technical knowledge categories and, instead,
provides a detailed account of how technical knowledge about financial
markets is produced and experienced. She is careful to note that the
legal practices of private regulatory groups such as the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) are embedded in broader
structures of power; yet, she insists that technical knowledge cannot be
reduced to social context because it has "its own epistemological and
material autonomy."13 By looking at the material qualities of regulatory
practices, Riles contends, we can gain valuable insights into the precise
mechanisms by which technical legal knowledge mediates the
governance of global financial markets. 14 Riles' insights are instructive
for those examining ILO, an institution in which science and technical
law have traditionally played important roles.
While Riles focuses her investigation on private governance of
financial markets, I explore technical knowledge produced by the ILO
that extends state-centered regulation into labor markets. Using the
Domestic Workers Convention enacted by the ILO in June 2011 as a
case study, my analysis aims to elucidate how technical devices
embedded in the century-old law-making apparatus of international
labor legislation mediated the translation of "decent work for domestic
workers" into an accepted and uncontroversial subject for regulatory
governance.

11. Id.
12. See generally ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011) (analyzing how day-to-day private actions can be

reformed to produce more effective forms of market regulation).
13. See id. at 20.
14. See id.

488

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs

21:2

Certainly, knowledge-production by ILO bureaucrats was not the
sole factor facilitating the realization of the Domestic Workers
Convention. The ILO's labor standard-setting apparatus is embedded
within a broader global governance regime that exerts an influence over
its operations. 15 Moreover, as discussed further in Part VI, the activities
of a transnational advocacy movement for domestic workers played a
crucial role both in placing "decent work for domestic workers" on the
ILO's agenda and in lobbying behind the scenes for the convention's
eventual enactment.' 6 Finally, political dynamics among the delegates,
as well as domestic political considerations, contributed to shaping the
form and content of the convention in important ways. In short, a
complex set of interactions among a range of actors produced the
Domestic Workers Convention. My exploration of how technical devices
shaped the experience of ILC participants aims to complement other
scholarly studies that focus on these various dimensions of international
labor lawmaking and thereby assemble a fuller picture of this process.
Technical knowledge produced by the ILO bureaucracy facilitated
the process of domestic worker standard-setting in significant ways.
These interventions operated through a technocratic modality that
manifested itself in both the interventions' ideational and material
dimensions. My empirical examination of this process calls attention to
three specific technical devices-charts, questionnaires, and split
paragraphs-that, I argue, are integral to the modality of knowledgeproduction associated with the ILO secretariat and the organization's
standard-setting apparatus. In the case of the Domestic Workers
Convention, these technical devices played a central role in facilitating
the realization of new legal instruments. These findings remind us that
it is not only neoliberal-governance programs that are advanced through
technical expertise. Exploring the aesthetics of international regulation
within the setting of the ILO-an organization that is institutionally
committed to opposing free market privatization-offers a glimpse of
how technical devices might be deployed more widely in the formulation
of alternative modalities of global governance.

15. See Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 126, 126 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); Guy Standing,
The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?,39 DEV. & CHANGE 355, 355 (2008).
16. See, e.g., BORIS & FISH, supra note 6; Stuart C. Rosewarne, The ILO's Domestic

Worker Convention (C189): Challenging the Gendered Disadvantage of Asia's Foreign
Domestic Workers?, 4 GLOBAL LAB. J. 1, 6 (2013).
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II. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
My analysis of the standard-setting process engaged in the
formulation of the Domestic Workers Convention relies on two distinct
sources of data: (1) written artifacts generated as part of the convention
drafting process, and (2) unstructured interviews with actors who
played a key role in the process and who provided context for
interpreting the documents. The research was facilitated by the fact
that, similar to other U.N. agencies, the ILO generates a large number
of documents and all official documents associated with the conventiondrafting process are made available to the public, which facilitates
research. These documents include the text of the original proposals for
standard-setting on domestic workers submitted to the ILO Governing
Body, which set the process in motion, as well as the proceedings of the
committee of delegates to the International Labour Conferences of 2010
and 2011 that was charged with drafting the Domestic Workers
Convention.
For the interview portion of the research, I spoke with staff
members of the ILO secretariat who had overseen the drafting of the
Domestic Workers Convention as well as with individuals who
participated in the drafting process as representatives of the ILO's
tripartite constituents. Unstructured interviews with the relatively
small circle of ILO officials most closely involved in this process were
invaluable for fleshing out the dynamics of convention-drafting. At the
same time, cognizant that members of the ILO Secretariat might
provide an overly generous account of their own contributions, I
maintained contrasting institutional affiliations with my other
informants who served to prevent the resulting analysis from being
unduly biased toward any single perspective.
While the involvement of some of these interviewees undoubtedly
predisposes them to emphasize their own contributions, this is not a
major concern. My overall aim in interpreting both the narratives these
actors offer and the documentary artifacts associated with the drafting
process is not to formulate any strong causal claim regarding the
primacy of technical devices and bureaucratic knowledge to the
enactment of the convention. Rather, in calling attention to the
contributions of previously unexplored components such as technical
devices, this study offers a further layer of nuance to elucidate how new
legal knowledge is produced and aims to enhance our understanding of
international lawmaking.
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III. THE LAW-MAKING APPARATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR
LEGISLATION

Before examining the specific case of standard-setting for domestic
workers, I provide a brief historical overview of the development of the
law-making apparatus of international labor legislation. Due to the
contemporary dominance of neoliberal market-based approaches, the
political rationales that have historically formed the basis for
international labor legislation are no longer widely familiar. A historical
lens offers a background on the general relations between the ILO's
staff and its constituent representatives, as well as the institutional
context that guides their interactions. These institutions established the
political boundaries within which technical expertise could operate as it
sought to engineer coherent standards for domestic work.
Institutionally, the ILO is a U.N. agency dealing with labor issues
that is distinguished by its tripartite governing structure. Governments,
employers, and workers are represented in a 2:1:1 ratio on both the ILO
Governing Body and at the annual International Labour Conference. 7
The Governing Body drafts the ILO's program and budget, supervises
the work of the ILO secretariat, and elects the Director-General. The
International Labour Conference (ILC) includes delegates from all of the
ILO's Member States. It meets in Geneva every year in June and has
the authority to adopt international conventions on labor standards,
which are binding on states that ratify them.18 The ILC also adopts
nonbinding recommendations and declarations.
The ILO's Geneva-based Secretariat, the International Labour
Office, is charged with carrying out the agenda set by the Governing
Body. From its founding period, in the aftermath of the First World
War, the Secretariat has included "political and diplomatic" divisions,
which coordinate with each of the organization's constituent groups
(workers, employers, and governments), as well as a separate
"scientific" or "technical" division, which produces publications,
statistics, and information.' 9 The ILO's first Director-General, the
French socialist politician Albert Thomas, encouraged the secretariat's
production of technical information as a means by which the
organization could avoid being dragged into the morass of polarized
international politics. 20 Thomas also asserted the authority of the
17. ILO, RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
STANDARDS 16-17 (2009).
18. Id. at 14.
19. E.J. PHELAN, YES AND ALBERT THOMAS 210 (Columbia University Press 1949)

(1936).
20. See id. at 184.
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Secretariat to steer the convention-drafting process by providing initial
draft texts for consideration by ILC delegates, a practice now formalized
in ILO operating procedures. 21 The ILO leadership thus has a lengthy
tradition of deploying institutional power to set the agenda of
international negotiations. In his classic account of the ILO,
organizational theorist Robert Cox describes it as a "limited monarchy"
in which proactive insiders can maneuver within the bounds of
constituent interests. 22 Although the pace of international labor
lawmaking has waxed and waned over time, the ILO Secretariat's basic
protocols and procedures have changed relatively little. 23 Yet, it is an
open question whether, in the contemporary international political
environment, the ILO's standard-setting apparatus, with its marked
emphasis on technical expertise, can be made operational or whether it
will end up rusting on the shelf like the industrial machinery whose
operations it was originally designed to regulate.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSETTING

The current moment is a particularly challenging one for
international labor legislation and for social democratic programs more
generally, given the dominance of a global governance ideology
privileging deregulation and labor market flexibility. The ILO has been
criticized for allegedly acceding to pressure from its largest funders,
particularly the U.S. government, to deemphasize its traditional social
democratic program and its commitment to organized collective
bargaining and to focus, instead, on supporting corporate social
responsibility initiatives. 24 At the end of the 1990s, seeking to reassert
the ILO's relevance in international debates on poverty, globalization,
and the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, the ILO Secretariat
initiated a call for all Member States to commit to the general principles
contained in the 1998 "Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work,"
but this new agenda drew intense criticism and was labeled by some

21. See id. at 251.

22. Robert W. Cox, ILO: Limited Monarchy, in THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION
MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 102 (Robert W. Cox et al. eds., 1973).
23. See generally EDWARD C. LORENZ, DEFINING GLOBAL JUSTICE : THE HISTORY OF
U.S. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS POLICY (2001); and Daniel Roger Maul, The
InternationalLabour Organizationand the Globalizationof Human Rights, 19.44-1970, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 301 (Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann ed., 2011)

(tracing the history of international labor laws and policies).
24. STANDING, supranote 15, at 368.
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observers as a move away from standards to "soft-promotionalism" and
voluntarism in implementation. 25
Although ILO's standard-setting project faces serious challenges,
the current moment is also a particularly dynamic one for international
policymaking on labor-related issues. Over the past two decades, while
neoliberal-governance projects have been contested by only a hanidful of
states, innovative advocacy strategies have emerged on the global
political scene as part of a broader mobilization for social justice or
"globalization from below." 26 The recent and interlinked campaigns for
migrant and domestic worker rights both emerged from this political
context. Starting in the mid-1990s, a new transnational coalition of
churches, dissident currents within the international labor movement,
and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began to
push for the enactment of enhanced and updated labor protections
suitable to the contemporary context in which global supply chains limit
the effectiveness of traditional models of collective bargaining. 27 This
transnational advocacy network sought to rebuild the progressive
movement from the grassroots after decades of social democratic
centralization, and its activists were committed to extending their
agenda beyond the traditional labor constituency of mostly male,
unionized, industrial employees. Working together, labor movement
reformists and NGO participants in this advocacy network lobbied to
convince representatives of the ILO Workers Group to incorporate
informal sector workers such as self-employed women workers, migrant
agricultural workers, and care workers.
Globally, this call to incorporate informal sector workers made
inroads within the labor movement and the human rights professional
advocacy community. Faced with a declining membership base, leaders
of a number of national and international trade union federations were
amenable to experimenting with new mobilization strategies that
offered union representation to informal sector workers and irregular
migrants. 28 Latin American and Caribbean trade unions were also
actively working to facilitate the collective organization of women
25. Philip Alston, 'Core Labour Standards'andthe Transformationof the International
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457, 518 (2004).
26. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social

Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW 29, 54 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
27. LORENZ, supra note 23, at 209-17; see also Schwenken & PrUgl, supra note 4, at
439.
28. LEAH

A.

HAus,

UNIONS,

IMMIGRATION,

AND

INTERNATIONALIZATION:

NEW

CHALLENGES AND CHANGING COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE (2002);

Patrick A. Taran & Luc Demaret, Action Imperatives for Trade Unions and Civil Society,
15 ASIAN PAC. MIGRATION J. 391, 391-404 (2006).
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workers employed in the informal economy. 29 International women s
rights advocates associated with Women in Informal Employment:
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), a policy research institute based
at Harvard University, were also active in fostering contacts with
grassroots organizations of women workers in Southeast and South
Asia.3 0 Together, these initiatives paralleled the concerns of human
rights NGOs who had embraced the cause of women's human rights and
had begun expanding their programs on social and economic rights. 31
The campaign to develop international labor legislation for domestic
workers emerged as a pilot project for this transnational advocacy
movement, which, by the mid-2000s, had attracted institutionalized
support. For reformists within the International Union of Food and
Allied Workers (IUF), a "global domestic worker movement" was a
flagship for ongoing efforts to represent informal-sector workers. 32
Because domestic worker advocates succeeded in developing an
organizational infrastructure with groups such as the Europe-based
RESPECT Network, a campaign for a new ILO convention provided a
tangible goal for women around which this project could be organized. 33
At an international conference held in Amsterdam in November 2006
under the auspices of the IUF, participants resolved to undertake a
concerted campaign for ILO standard-setting in the area of domestic
work.34 To advance the goal of building a global movement, advocates
formed the International Domestic Workers Network (IDWN). It aimed
to foster relations with supportive labor organizations, NGOs, and
research institutes, while also providing a platform through which

29. See Asha D'Souza, Moving Towards Decent Work for Domestic Workers: An
Overview of the ILO's Work 80 (ILO Bureau for Gender Equality, Working Paper No. 2,
2010).
30. See

WOMEN

IN

INFORMAL

EMP.:

GLOBALIZING

AND

ORGANIZING,

http://www.wiego.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
31. See Jo BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY IN
PRACTICE 32-58 (2013).

32. Telephone Interview with Barbro Budin, Equality Officer, Int'l Union of Food and
Allied Workers (Apr. 23, 2012).
33. The Rights Equality Solidarity Power Europe Cooperation Today (RESPECT)
network was created in 1998 as a network of migrant domestic workers grassroots
organizations, migrant rights support organizations, trade unions, and human rights
NGOs. It receives funding from the European Commission and promotes the rights of
migrant domestic workers and the implementation of public policy measures to improve
their working conditions, to prevent abuse and exploitation, and campaigns for recognition
of the value of their work and their legal recognition. About Us, RESPECT,
http://www.respectnetworkeu.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
34. See, e.g., Celia Mather, Respect and Rights: Protection for Domestic/Household
Workers!, (2006), http://www.ifwea.org/@Bin/148866/2006RespectAndRightsDmstcWrkrs.pdf.
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domestic worker organizations could build their organizing capacities. 35
The goal was to build a strong movement for regulating domestic work
that would have both top-down and bottom-up support.
In February 2007, the organizers of the Amsterdam conference, in
cooperation with International Congress of Federated Trade Unions
(ICFTU) Director Anna Biondi, approached the ILO's Bureau of Worker
Activities (ACTRAV) to explore possibilities for placing standard-setting
procedures for domestic workers on the ILO's agenda. 36 As the primary
liaison for worker interests within the ILO, ACTRAV has a mandate to
support its constituents in the workers group. Moreover, when ILO
began promoting migrant worker issues as one of its priorities,
ACTRAV staff began including individuals with a background in
international migrant human rights advocacy who supported
nontraditional approaches to labor organizing. On hearing the proposal
for domestic worker standard-setting, ACTRAV staff embraced the
project and decided to propose that the International Labour Conference
discuss domestic worker standard-setting at the next available
opportunity. 37 The first step, in which technocratic knowledge would
play a key mediating role, involved convincing the ILO Governing Body
to formally place the topic on the ILC's conference agenda.
V. INSERTING DOMESTIC WORKERS INTO THE ILO AGENDA

The combination of deregulatory pressures and grassroots responses
described in the previous section provides a sketch of the political
context from which the project of domestic worker standard-setting
emerged. Commencing in the spring of 2007, the ILO's Geneva-based
Secretariat took up the domestic worker activists' proposal, and began
the task of reorganizing a loose-knit but energetic transnational
advocacy campaign into a law-making initiative. In order to advance,
the standard-setting project would need to be made comprehensible for
the ILO's tripartite constituency. And ACTRAV's team of specialized
labor liaisons held primary responsibility for refraining the topic in the
terms of the ILO's official mandate and making the case that domestic
workers deserved a place on the ILO agenda.
The first step in doing so involved presenting "Decent Work for
Domestic Workers" as one of the organization's major unfinished tasks
that involved a range of strategic tasks and maneuvers. Representatives
on the ILO's Governing Body were sent a briefing note calling attention

35. See BORIS & FISH, supra note 6.
36. Telephone Interview with Barbro Budin, supranote 32.
37. Telephone Interview with ACTRAV Staff (Apr. 17, 2012).
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to the fact that the ILO had first considered standard-setting in this
area in 1948 and that a resolution of the International Labour
Conference in 1965 had again endorsed placing conditions of domestic
workers on the agenda.3 8 As the ACTRAV brief pointed out, "Much of
the concern expressed in 1948 and 1965 remains valid today as the
problems faced by domestic workers seem to have been further
exacerbated and their numbers are growing." 39 Strikingly, this history
narrative strategically avoided mentioning that existing ILO
conventions pertaining to migrant labor had not only failed to include
domestic workers in their coverage, but also had explicitly excluded
domestic workers from the expanding corpus of labor protections. 40 This
was politically astute, since a stronger case could be made for regulating
domestic work if it appeared as an unfinished project as opposed to a
topic that fell outside the historical social democratic consensus.
Having gestured at the history of labor standards, the brief to the
Governing Body also highlighted the link between domestic worker
standard-setting and the ILO's current mandate of promoting a "decent
work agenda" as embodied in its 1998 "Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work," which prioritized freedom of
association, elimination of forced labor, abolition of child labor, and
elimination of discrimination in employment. 4 1 In this respect,
ACTRAV's brief could point to an expert report prepared as part of the
general discussion on migrant workers at the 2004 International Labour
Conference, which stressed that migrant domestic workers are among
the world's most vulnerable workers. 42 Along the same lines, the brief
cited the ILO Global Report of 2006, which had noted the high incidence
of child labor in domestic work. 43 It emphasized the existence of
comparative research by showing the need to address discriminatory
labor laws that grant domestic workers lower levels of protection than
38. Id.
39. ILO, Agenda of the InternationalLabour Conference: Proposals for the Agenda of
the 99th Session (2010)of the Conference, 1 52, at 15 (2007).
40. In the period of social democratic consensus immediately before and after the
Second World War, foreign labor migrants had come to be included within the purview of
international labor standard-setting, with ILO conventions committing states to providing
permanent immigrants and regularly-admitted temporary guestworkers with no less
favorable access to social assistance programs than that given to their own nationals.
However, both the Migration for Employment Convention of 1939 and the revised
Convention of 1949, explicitly excluded workers in the informal sector. See ILO Migration
for Employment Convention, June 28, 1939, ILO No. 66; ILO Migration for Employment
Convention, July 1, 1949, ILO No. 97.
41. Int'l Labour Conf., ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
37 I.L.M. 1233 (June 18, 1998).
42. ILO, Int'l Labour Conference: Provisional Record No. 22, 17 (2004).
43. See ILO, supranote 39, 155, at 16.
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other categories of workers. 44 Finally, the brief highlighted that the
ILO's Committee of Experts had noted that in some countries labor laws
explicitly deny domestic workers the right to organize, severely
threatening freedom of association. 45 In all of these ways, the proposal
aimed to convince members of the Governing Body that domestic worker
standard-setting was a logical extension of the organization's previously
settled agenda.
While the rhetorical insertion of domestic worker standard-setting
into existing ILO projects was particularly successful in generating
interest within the Governing Body for the general notion of promoting
"Decent Work for Domestic Workers," the proposal for drafting a
convention still faced opposition. In keeping with their group's
previously established position, employer delegates remained
adamantly opposed to any additional exercises in standard-setting;
meanwhile, some governments suggested convening a committee of
experts rather than proceeding to standard-setting right away. As the
discussion of proposed agenda items was carried over to the next
Governing Body meeting in March 2008 without a clear frontrunner
among competing proposals, the task for supporters of standard-setting
for domestic workers was to garner support for their initiative by
demonstrating that it was a natural extension of the ILO's current
programs and policies.
To respond to concerns that standard-setting for domestic workers
was premature, ACTRAV staff produced an exhaustive stock-taking of
ILO policies and programs related to domestic workers. 46 The genealogy
of domestic work regulation within the ILO was extended to include a
resolution adopted at the 1936 International Labour Conference that
advocated for inscribing the issue for future investigation and
discussion. 47 This "mapping" of the existing research onto ILO's
historical documents points to initiatives on domestic workers
undertaken by more than a dozen segments of the organization's
bureaucracy. In other words, compiling an arsenal of documents
demonstrated a consensus building on the issue and made it possible to
assert that "Decent Work for Domestic Workers" qualified as a project
ripe for standard-setting, tilled by technicians and experts.

44. Id.
45. See generally ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 44-107
(1994) (describing the global state of the right of workers and employers to establish and
join organizations).

46. See ILO, Date, Place and Agenda of the 99th Session (2010) of the International
Labour Conference, 144-66, at 13-18 (2008).
47. ILO, Resolutions Adopted by the Conference, 20 INT'L LABOUR CONF. PROC. 740
(1936).
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Not surprisingly, in March 2008, the ILO Governing Body agreed to
placerdomestic worker standard-setting on the agenda of the 99th and
100th- International Labour Conferences, with the aim of producing a
convention by June 2011.48
yVI.

DRAFTING "DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS" INTO
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Now that the table had been set to begin work on domestic workers'
issues at the ILO, the ILO agreed to convene its tripartite constituency
for a discussion of domestic worker standard-setting. However, it was
not certain that the ILO would successfully translate "Decent Work for
Domestic Workers" fifteen months later into a new international
convention. For many traditionalists within the ILO, the idea of
establishing standards for domestic workers was both unexpected and
puzzling. Unlike the child labor issue, public opinion did not seem
outraged by the treatment of domestic workers. Unsurprisingly, child
labor was one of the few topics on which the ILO had recently managed
to produce a successful convention. 49 Skeptics within the organization
argued that the ILO should devote its attention to other projects,
suggesting that members of the public would say, "I have a maid and I
treat her well. She's a contract worker, so I shouldn't pay social security.
It will have direct consequences on my pay, and I don't want a jackbooted labor inspector bursting into my house."5 0 Supporters of domestic
worker rights, although passionately committed to the issue, likewise
did not anticipate the imminent completion of any new standard-setting
instrument. 51
The new standard-setting initiative, having received the go-ahead
from the Governing Body, was handed to the ILO's Conditions of Work
and Employment Branch (TRAVAIL), which would be responsible for
drafting the text that would form the basis for the first round of
International Labour Conference committee deliberations. According to
48. ILO, Int' Labour Conference: Decent Work for Domestic Workers Report lV(1) 1
(2010).
49. See ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, ILO C182.
Other recent standard-setting efforts had fallen short. An attempt in 1998 to create labor
standards for contract workers had not been successful due to resistance by employers.
The 2005 Meeting of Experts on labor standards for migrant workers had resulted only in
a vague "Framework for Labour Migration" adopted by the Governing Body rather than a
convention. The 1996 Homework Convention has been ratified by only four countries and
is "effectively a dead letter." Standing, supranote 15, at 366.
50. Interview with George Dragnich, Former ILO Assistant Director General, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 6, 2011).
51. Telephone Interview with Barbro Budin, supra note 32.
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standard ILO procedure, the first step in this drafting process is a "law
and practice report" that canvasses regulatory practices across ILO
Member States to lay out the "state of the art" in the relevant sector of
employment. 52 In drafting the report, the aim was to translate the social
justice agenda of a transnational advocacy network into a more
legalized and programmatic form.
This translation was particularly challenging in the case of domestic
workers because the report would first have to justify that a sector
existed across national contexts. The term as commonly used appeared
to encompass a range of activities that cut across the categories of
"domestic helpers and cleaners" and "housekeeping and personal care"
in the International Standard Classification of Occupations, which
formed the basis for most labor force surveys. 53 Some national
legislation specified the inclusion or exclusion of specific occupations in
domestic work, but there was substantial variation across countries.
Activists varied in whether they identified themselves as "care
workers," "household workers," or "domestic workers." 54 Fitting "Decent
Work for Domestic Workers" into the conceptual framework of
international standard-setting, which presents itself as formalizing
practices that states have already adopted or are trying to adopt, would
require substantial reinterpretation of existing law and practice.
Sensitive to these challenges, and willing to pursue all options to
secure a successful convention that might make a difference to a
particularly vulnerable group while also lifting the ILO's flagging
international reputation, the TRAVAIL office staff made the decision to
recruit external expertise. Collaboration with external experts is a
practice the ILO has often used when standard-setting initiatives
branch into new domains of economic activity. In the case of standardsetting for domestic workers, the majority of the research for the Law
and PracticeReport was conducted by a Canadian legal scholar, Adelle
Blackett, who had previous ILO experience and had developed
arguments applying human rights standards to care work. Blackett's
involvement expanded the ambitions of the project. Not only would the
Law and PracticeReport for "Decent Work for Domestic Workers" follow
traditional ILO practice of compiling national regulatory practices
related to a previously unregulated area of employment, it would also
aim to expand the bounds of existing labor law by grounding the

52. ILO, supra note 17, at 17.
ILO,
Occupations,
of
Classification
Standard
53. International
http://www.ilo.org/public/englishlbureau/stat/isco/index.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
54. See, e.g., MATHER, supra note 34.
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discussion of labor protections in a critical race and feminist legal
analysis.55
Within the ILO's tradition of detailed technical knowledgeproduction, the Law and PracticeReport for "Decent Work for Domestic
Workers" typically presents an especially exhaustive coverage of its
subject. The original report was longer, but its published version had to
be cut to one-hundred pages for funding and translation reasons.5 6
Blackett and her research assistant reviewed the law governing
domestic work in seventy-two ILO Member States, presenting this
research in the report's lengthy Appendix. This careful compilation of
existing national laws aimed to preempt criticism that standard-setting
for domestic workers only addressed conditions in developed economies,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the eventual convention would be
broadly ratified.
To convince its readers that sufficient regulatory basis for writing
specific standards existed, as opposed to a vague declaration of
principle, the report details innovative techniques for advancing the
social protections of domestic workers. Among the "good practices"
discussed in the report,5 7 the Working Conditions Chapter notes that
French legislation offers "one of the most detailed attempts to gear the
employment contract specifically to the domestic work relationships and
enforce it in such a way as to prevent abuse."58 Going beyond the
traditional labor law topics of wages and hours, labor inspection, and
access to dispute resolution mechanisms, the report also addresses the
need to ensure equal treatment and freedom of association to ensure full
social inclusion for domestic workers.59 It highlights national legislation
mandating that domestic workers should have access to food of good
quality, as well as laws formalizing the conditions under which migrant
domestic workers will be repatriated. The comprehensive marshaling of
detail propels the readers to the conclusion that "creative
experimentation in regulating the occupation is under way in a broad
cross-section of member states around the world" and that an eventual
convention would "build on many of the national regulatory innovations
in law and practice identified in this report. . . ."6o
55. Adelle Blackett, Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 23
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 1 n.1 (2011).
56. E-mail from Adelle Blackett to Leila Kawar, (July 30, 2012) (on file with author).
57. Blackett studiously avoided the language of "best" practices, focusing instead on
good practices, and thus acknowledging the limits of existing legal treatment of domestic
workers. Id.
58. ILO, Int'l Labour Conference: Decent Work for Domestic Workers Report IV(I) 47
(2010).
59. Id. at 17-24.
60. Id. at 94-95.
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We likewise see legal engineering at work in the report's handling of
public uncertainty over whether a sector-specific convention would be
appropriate for the heterogeneous activities falling within the category
of domestic work. The report begins by acknowledging this uncertainty
over whether it is appropriate to speak of a "domestic work sector" in a
short "Note on Terminology" at the end of its first chapter.6 ' Having
preempted the criticism of failing to address the issue, the report then
proceeds to discursively and semantically smooth away any doubt that
the existence of a "domestic work sector" is an established fact. This
textual substitution of solidity for heterogeneity is illustrated in a
section entitled "Defining Domestic Work," which begins by setting out a
general definition ("a fundamental criterion of domestic work is that it
takes place in the 'household'), and then notes that "not all countries
surveyed provide guidance on the nature of domestic work."62 However,
rather than focusing on intrasectoral differences, the text offers a series
of charts that contrasts "domestic workers" with "general workers." 63
Reading the footnote, one finds that the former is an aggregate of a
variety of occupational classifications that vary across the seventy-one
countries canvassed by the report.64 In the colored charts, however,
"domestic workers" appears as a concrete and delimited labor force
"sector," akin to coal miners or steel workers. Similarly, a table listing
"Domestic workers as a percentage of total employment" subsumes
domestic workers into the broader category of workers whose
employment relationship might be the subject of regulation. 65
We see yet another instance of textual devices translating
uncertainty into certainty in the sections of the report that address
criticisms or standard-setting for domestic work based, first, on privacy
rights and, second, on state sovereignty over immigration matters. The
technique for addressing the first of these criticisms involves a
rhetorical substitution of "household" for "home." The report
acknowledges privacy concerns evoked by labor inspections within the
"household" but draws on an observation by the ILO's Committee of
Experts that the employer has consented to give up some privacy rights
by choosing to make the household a workplace.6 6 The second criticism,
related to the argument that immigration status should take priority

61. See id. at 15 (noting that the language surrounding "this occupation" has varied
over time according to geographical and cultural context, and that "self-definition,
particularly by those doing the work, is crucial").
62. Id. at 28-30.
63. Id. at 49-50.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 73.
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over labor protection, is addressed through a technique of textual reordering. Rather than subordinating labor law to immigration law,
effectively denying labor protections to irregular migrants, a separate
chapter on "Combating Forced Labour in Migrant Domestic Work,"
instead, foregrounded a human rights perspective, creating positive
obligations for states regardless of sovereignty or immigration status.
At the end of this comprehensive and critically informed discussion
of law and practice, the report's final section consists of a questionnaire
addressed to Member States.6 7 The wording of each of the sixty-three
questions was the result of extensive informal consultations carried out
by the Secretariat with ILO constituents and was carefully chosen to
avoid having responses stating that standard-setting was premature.6 8
Phrases such as "consistent with national practice" were chosen to
reassure constituents that any enacted standard-setting instrument
would include flexibility devices.69 Drafters also gave careful attention
to the ordering of the questions relating to the convention's substantive
provisions, beginning with issues of fundamental rights, then moving to
working conditions and social security and placing controversial issues
such as labor inspection and protections specific to migrant domestic
workers at the end of the questionnaire. Presented as a logical
progression from the scientific data amassed in the report's preceding
analysis, the questionnaire was designed to delimit and structure the
convention-drafting process so as to reduce as much as possible the
likelihood that standard-setting would be paralyzed by constituent
disagreements during the official ILC discussion sessions.70
The Secretariat's efforts to lay the groundwork for eventual
constituent discussion continued into the next phase of the conventiondrafting process. In this phase, the TRAVAIL staff compiled and
organized Member-State responses to the questionnaire received
between March and August 2009 into a set of "proposed conclusions"
that would serve as the draft text for ILC negotiations. The secretariat
referred to this second report as the "telephone book," due to its massive
length (433 pages) and yellow cover page.71 One important function of
this Yellow Report was to highlight the participatory nature of the
consultation process and generate constituent "buy-in" for the
forthcoming ILC sessions. 72 The report's preface presents a lengthy list
of respondents, highlighting participation from more than 103 Member
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 99-117.
Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL Staff (Apr. 18, 2012).
See ILO, supra note 58, at 106.
Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL, supra note 68.
Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL Staff (Apr. 20, 2012).
Id.
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States, thereby displaying the interest that standard-setting was
generating. Included among the list of respondents were international
worker and employer associations and NGOs who were technically not
entitled to submit formal responses but whose participation, in the
calculation of the secretariat, contributed to creating a sense of
momentum for standard-setting. 73 Devoting more than 400 pages to a
detailed discussion of these constituent responses, the report affirmed
pluralistic internationalism of standard-setting. In these ways, textual
devices were deployed so as to reduce constituent hesitancy by imbuing
domestic worker standard-setting with an aura of legislative
inevitability.
At the same time that the Yellow Report cultivated a spirit of
constituent participation, it transformed and reworked constituent
responses to generate momentum for lawmaking. The Secretariat
controlled how responses were presented, offering summaries rather
than reproducing the full text of the responses, which allowed the
Secretariat to underline areas of common ground. The report's
discussion section goes even further toward clearing the path to
consensus. By aggregating responses that endorsed one of three
different forms of convention (stand-alone, combined with a
recommendation, or including binding and nonbinding provisions). In
the end, the Secretariat could make the claim that "a considerable
majority of respondents favour the adoption of a convention," while
covering differences of opinion. 74
The technocratic style of this engineering, in contrast with a more
explicitly political mode of intervention, is highlighted by the fact that
the text of the "Proposed Conclusions," presented at the conclusion of
the Yellow Report, represent less a revision of the questionnaire based
on Member-State responses than a reorganization of its contents.
Difficult issues such as regulation of "stand-by" time, where
disagreement could not be smoothed away through generous
interpretation, were relegated to the nonbinding recommendation
accompanying the convention.7 5 The Secretariat built exclusion clauses
into sections of the conclusions where the secretariat anticipated that
this was the only means of obtaining widespread support.7 6 These legal
73. Id. Perhaps in the interest of fostering pluralistic internationalism, the authors of
the report avoid any mention of the fact that the International Trade Union Congress had
provided a template of questionnaire responses to promote a unified response on the part
of national worker associations.
74. ILO, Int'1 Labour Conference: Decent Work for Domestic Workers Report IV(2)
(2010).
75. Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL, supra note 71.
76. For example, point five in the proposed conclusions states, "the Convention should
apply to all domestic workers, provided that a Member which has ratified it may . . .
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technical devices aimed to preserve the viability of standard-setting by
bridging the gap between political realities and the aspiration of
characteristic of the ILO's post-1998
universal applicability
fundamental rights approach.
By the time the International Labour Conference's Committee on
Domestic Workers gathered for its first discussion, the apparatus of
international labor lawmaking had already made substantial progress
toward carving out a settled understanding of "Decent Work for
Domestic Workers." Indeed, the convention's conceptual core proved
sturdy enough to withstand committee discussions in June 2010 that
were characterized by an obstructionist employer delegation, an
energetic but acutely inexperienced worker delegation, and a weak
committee chair who, according to some participants, had difficulty with
crowd control.7' The fully-reviewed text that the 2010 ILC Committee
managed, albeit narrowly, to extract from the cauldron of its
disorganized and sometimes antagonistic scrutiny included a number of
minor amendments-most notably a revised definition of the scope of
coverage-but was substantially the same as the Office's proposed
conclusions.7 8
As the convention-drafting process moved ahead, the aim for the
Secretariat's technocrats was to deploy their expertise to facilitate
consensus without stripping all meaning from the text. One aspect of
achieving this revision consisted of purely formal revisions: replacing
"should" with "shall" to conform with ILO stylistic conventions. But
there was also room for exercising editorial judgment, such as moving
clauses around to create a more readable instrument and amending
language to ensure the form of the text was consistent with other ILO
instruments. In the end, this revision process enhanced legal legibility
and allowed the text to pass muster as part of the body of international
law. As a binding treaty on ratifying states, it could not adopt the
"additive approach to resolving differences," favored by U.N.
declarations, in which legibility is arguably less important than the
text's aspirational and expressive role in representing all points of view
regardless of coherence.79 By August 2010, the Office had produced a
third report, the Brown Report, which transformed the texts from

exclude wholly or partly from its scope limited categories of workers when its application
to them would raise special problems of a substantive nature." This aimed to take care of
the fact that many countries had special laws governing "au pairs." Id. at 418.
77. Interview with Robert Shepard, Senior U.S. Gov't ILC Delegate, in Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 2012).
78. See generally ILO, Int'l Labour Conference: Report of the Committee on Domestic
Workers ProvisionalRecord No. 12 (2010).
79. ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT 79 (2000).
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"proposed conclusions" into the more legally legible form of "proposed
convention and proposed recommendation."8 0
In the fall of 2010 and winter of 2011, the standard-setting process
moved from a technocratic to a political modality that took the form of a
series of informal consultations with decision makers who were not
present at the Committee's deliberations. Here again, the Secretariat
intervened to informally broker consensus. Following the ILO tradition
of providing support for Member States' consultations with employer
and worker representatives, TRAVAIL staff took trips to meet with key
governments to talk about the Convention, to build political support,
and to identify possible compromises to issues that had emerged
through the Committee's debate.81 This behind-the-scenes brokering
was bolstered by energetic mobilizations on the part of domestic worker
advocates and human rights groups who lobbied governments and
employer organizations who had previously expressed misgivings about
any new standard-setting initiative to vote to enact the convention and
recommendation. 82
During this period of consultations and informal negotiations,
technical devices continued to play an important role. One technique
deployed to bridge remaining differences consisted of splitting
paragraphs of the proposed Convention into multiple parts, thereby
dampening controversy or facilitating differentiated treatment of topics
where the issues were ill suited to generic standards. 83 Another
technique involved leaving the text unchanged but developing language
to provide an optional starting point for the second round of
negotiations, should delegates choose to use it. These interventions did
little to alter the substantive content of the draft instruments, yet by
preemptively smoothing over differences between constituents, the
Secretariat reduced the risk that any minor point of difference would
instigate a more serious disagreement at the next round of committee
discussions. In the spring of 2011, drafters sent a final set of reports
containing the revised draft instruments to the ILO's Member States.
The first of these Blue Reports also included an explanatory text that, in
similar fashion to the Yellow Report, detailed the replies received in
response to each article and summarized how proposed changes had
been incorporated by the Office into the text. As with the Yellow Report,
the Blue Report highlighted the large number of constituent responses
to generate enthusiasm for the final round of negotiations, which would
80.
81.
82.
Rights
83.

ILO, supra note 48, at 95.
Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL, supra note 71.
Telephone Interview with Jo Becker, Advocacy Dir., Children's Rights Div., Human
Watch (Apr. 16, 2012).
Telephone Interview with TRAVAIL, supra note 71.
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take place four months later when the ILC met for its one-hundredth
session.
When the Domestic Worker Committee reconvened in June 2011 for
a second and final round of negotiations, the adjustments made in the
preceding year set the stage for a discussion without any major
surprises. A new and more forceful committee chair, working with the
Secretariat, grouped similar amendments together and selected a single
representative proposal for discussion rather than having the group
work through each amendment individually. 84 Significantly, the
International Organization of Employers dropped its prior opposition to
standard-setting for domestic workers and played a constructive role in
the discussions. In nine fully packed days of sessions, the Committee
was able to make its way through the convention and accompanying
recommendation. 85 To the great delight of many delegates, not least the
exuberant group of domestic worker activists in attendance, a twothirds majority approved the texts on June 16th at the plenary sitting of
the Conference. 86
VII. ANALYSIs: ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAw

Standards for domestic workers entered the corpus of international
labor law through a process that was powered by a transnational
advocacy campaign but steered by members of the ILO's Geneva-based
secretariat. The "insider" activists who shepherded the standard-setting
process within the ILO were motivated by multiple goals. My
interviewees, often in the same breath, explained their efforts with
references to both the ILO's organizational mandate and their own
social justice commitments. One might assume that more prosaic
organizational considerations, particularly a desire to restore the ILO's
flagging reputation within the U.N. system, and personal career
ambitions, also factored into their desire to see the project succeed.
Putting aside the tricky question of the values or preferences that
motivated them, it is clear that expert involvement moved the process
forward by bridging the distance between the contrasting modalities of
partisanship and law.8 7 Over the course of four years, five reports, two

84. ILO, Int'l Labour Conference: Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers
55-58 (2011).
ProvisionalRecord No. 15,
85. See generally id.
86. See BORIS & FISH, supra note 6.
87. This is not to suggest that there is any objective "reality" of labor relations that
technical knowledge is obscuring or diverting. As Annelise Riles has shown in her study of
UN lawmaking on gender issues, bureaucratic knowledge draws on sources of knowledge
external to international institutions even as it converts this knowledge into a different
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conferences, and numerous informal consultations, an international
standard-setting apparatus that had fallen into disuse was mobilized by
a loose network of international civil servants and expert consultants
who worked individually and cooperatively to deploy the apparatus's
law-making techniques. Many different law-making tactics were
engaged in this process, but here I draw attention to the contributions of
three particularly useful devices: charts, questionnaires, and split
paragraphs.
A. Charts
Before a convention could be enacted into law, its proponents
needed to address concerns that domestic work as a sector of
employment was not yet ready for standard-setting. The 120-page Law
and Practice Report and the subsequent 500-page Yellow Report are
both notable for their length. Yet, it is the charts and appendices that
are especially effective in impressing on skeptical readers the legal
integrity of domestic worker standards. In the Law and PracticeReport,
the series of charts and tables that contrasts the "working conditions of
domestic workers" with those of other recognized occupations
transforms a heterogeneous composite of maids, nannies, and other
household workers into a single entity. The "dynamism" of current
national-level regulatory initiatives, crucial for asserting the regulatory
basis of international standard-setting, is made palpable by the
insertion of an appendix containing details for each country and, in
some cases, for subnational political units as well. In terms of their
substantive content, these reports drew on critical academic
perspectives that distance themselves from the scientific positivism of
earlier progressive efforts.88 Yet, their charts, tables, and appendices
suggest that a scientific style of presentation retains its usefulness in
establishing the shared body of knowledge on which regulations can be
built.
modality. See Riles, infra note 96. In the case of the Domestic Worker standard-setting,
the interventions of ILO insiders were grounded on both the endpoints of academic
knowledge and the expressed claims of social movement activists. Yet, when incorporated
into the standard-setting process, academic concepts and activist claims were translatedthrough the application of technocratic devices-into a more programmatic modality. Id.
88. The Law and Practice Report for "Decent Work for Domestic Workers" explicitly
disavows hierarchical regulatory modalities, redefining labor law as "labor inclusion,"
stressing the gendered and racialized dimensions of domestic work, and studiously avoids
economistic language. In the preliminary section of the report, although less so in the
substantive chapters, legal regulation is conceptualized within a socially reconstructionist
project driven by domestic workers' own struggles for recognition and respect. See ILO,
supra note 58.
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B. Questionnaires
The International Labour Conference is an unwieldy setting for
lawmaking: negotiations are spaced at yearly intervals and a large
number of the ILC delegates, particularly the workers' and employers'
representatives, have not previously participated in international
lawmaking. Early in its history, the ILO secretariat developed the
constituent questionnaire as a means of seeking information from
constituents about their eventual negotiating positions while guiding
them toward a unified stance. ILO technocrats, charged with
shepherding the Domestic Workers Convention through the drafting
process, deployed this device with notable astuteness to cultivate
consensus behind the scenes. The construction of the questionnaire's
sixty questions-whose substance and phrasing would disqualify them
as leading questions in any Anglo-American courtroom-provided the
raw materials for carving out a consensus position. Moreover, reporting
the results of the questionnaire provided a further opportunity for
building consensus: in a single document, the Yellow Report, the
Secretariat first laboriously acknowledged and presented all individual
constituent responses to the questionnaire (the first 416 pages) and then
glossed this multitude into a unified set of "general conclusions" (the
last six pages) that would subsequently serve as the textual basis for
law-making negotiations. These devices, when skillfully deployed, allow
a fastidious cultivation of consensus that simultaneously avoids
alienating constituents.8 9 In the case of the Domestic Workers
Convention, they produced a draft convention solid enough to pass
through a particularly turbulent committee review in one piece.

C. Split Paragraphs
The success of international labor legislation has traditionally been
assessed in terms of its ability to enact "standards with teeth" rather
than general statements of principle.9 0 However, despite the most
careful preparations, not all issues allow for creative assertions of
common ground. The aesthetic device of splitting paragraphs-a tool
familiar to jurists trained in the formalist Civil Law tradition-emerged
as a powerful instrument for bridging positions that, on their face,
remained at odds. Following the first round of ILC discussions, the
Brown Report and Blue Report each offered an opportunity to rework
89. The questionnaire and its accompanying Law and Practice Report have arguably
been less rigorously researched and comprehensive in scope in some of the ILO's other
recent conventions. E-mail from Adelle Blackett, supra note 56.
90. See Alston, supra note 25, at 496; and Standing, supra note 15.
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the text in this manner, repackaging wording that reflected hard-nosed
treaty negotiations into a more palatable form that could be presented
as the "official" text of the convention. Articles containing a single long
paragraph, including exceptions for the powerful migrant-receiving
states of the. European Union, were split in two.91 As redrafted, an
initial paragraph laid out a declaration of universal principles applying
to all migrant domestic workers, while a subsequent paragraph briefly
noted that these universal standards would not apply to workers who,
under already existing interstate agreements, "enjoy freedom of
movement for the purpose of employment." 92 While the provision
produced during negotiations had read as - a blunt political
acknowledgment of the European Union's favoritism of EU residents,
the redrafted text reads as a double affirmation of rights. As a technical
solution, splitting paragraphs smoothed over the absence of
universalism produced by disparities of power between states and made
the text sufficiently politically palatable to overcome objections to its
enactment as international law.
Analyzing the law-making role of mundane techniques such as
charts, questionnaires, and split paragraphs calls our attention to
aspects of the convention-drafting process that might previously have
been dismissed as mere proceduralism. It is a form of close empirical
analysis that parallels recent efforts by constructivist international
relations scholars to bring a more detailed empiricism into the study of
international organizations. These studies emphasize that actors within
international organizations exercise an agenda-setting power to
promote law-making efforts in the face of Member-State indifference.9 3
They also show that actors within international organizations can
reinterpret constituent expectations, using rhetorical devices to reframe
debates in a way that avoids alienating Member States. 94 In these
accounts, an international organization is not simply an arena in which
the dominant international regime of a given era is played out; rather,
91. ILO, Int'l Labour Conference: Decent Work for Domestic Workers Report IV(2B) 12
(2011).

92. Id.
93. See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 50 (2004). See generally RAWI
ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007) (showing that
initiatives for capital account liberalization came from within the management of the IMF
and that these initiatives faced little external opposition because potential opponents were
either indifferent or uninformed).
94. See generally NITSAN CHOREV, THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BETWEEN
NORTH AND SOUTH (2012) (answering the question of how international bureaucracies
respond to external demands that may not be compatible with their own perceptions and
goals).
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organizational dynamics are seen to exert their own unique influence
over the content of policy norms.
My account of the politics of the ILO Domestic Workers Convention
undertakes a finely detailed analysis of the law-making process, while
offering two refinements of organizationally grounded approaches. First,
I emphasize that it was not simply rhetorical skill but also a series of
materially concrete techniques that contributed to constructing
regulatory consensus on international standards. As ethnographic
studies of science point out, laboratory instruments and modes of
graphic inscription play a knowledge-construction role by bridging the
gap between, on the one hand, the locality-particularity and
materiality of lived experience-and, on the other hand, the
standardization and universality that make scientific findings
compatible with the existing body of synoptic knowledge.9 5 Recent sociolegal work draws on these insights from science studies to explore the
mediating role of documents in producing legal knowledge, with a focus
on their aesthetic dimension.96 My analysis explores the constructive
work contributed by legal techniques engaged in the ILO's conventionproduction process. It highlights the role of three particular technical
devices in advancing international lawmaking: charts, questionnaires,
and paragraph splitting. While Riles argues that governance through
technique is a defining feature of neoliberalism,97 the case study of the
ILO reminds us that technical expertise likewise facilitates the
regulatory knowledge-production of the interventionist welfare state.
Second, my analysis differs from that of existing constructivist
studies of international organizations by taking the entirety of the
convention-production process as its focus. For organizational
sociologists, the theoretical aim is to show that bureaucracies, at the
national or international level, have the capacity to act as "autonomous
agents" with distinct "preferences."9 8 By contrast, my analysis avoids
conceptualizing the ILO as a personified "agent." Rather, I examine the
process of international lawmaking as a series of transformations and
translations effected by actors with a range of commitments who
participated in its various stages. The object of study is a law-making
"apparatus" consisting of a chain of knowledge-producing associations
that exceeds the administrative control of any specific agent.9 9 New
95. See LATOUR, supra note 10, at 51-72.

96. Annelise Riles, [Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucraticand
Anthropological Analysis, in DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 71, 74
(Annelise Riles ed., 2006).
97. RILES, supranote 12, at 102.
98. See CHOREV, supra note 94, at 18, 23.
99. See LATOUR, supra note 10, at 192.
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legal norms creating rights for domestic workers were the product of a
law-making apparatus that engaged multiple types of actors, agendas,
and techniques. The effect of these technocratic interventions, which
produced empirical certainty and political consensus where none had
previously existed, was to advance the production of new international
law.
CONCLUSION
As this article has shown, the achievement of "Decent Work for
Domestic Workers" was made possible by the highly structured and
tightly controlled process of ILO standard-setting, and the skilled
technicians who steered this law-making apparatus. The contributions
of these human rights lawyers, labor economists, and "insider" labor
advocates included both rhetorical refraining and more tangible modes
of legal reengineering. Technocratic devices-charts, questionnaires,
and split paragraphs-created a space for domestic workers to be
recognized as a new category of employees and for international
consensus to be secured on appropriate standards for this group. In the
words of one seasoned NGO advocate who had observed the standardsetting process for the Domestic Worker Convention, this was a case
where ILO technocrats and their expert collaborators "made the
machine work."100
To be sure, technical devices do not operate outside of politics or
history. If this form of expertise was successful in translating household
servants and caregivers into workers and rights-bearing subjects, it was
because the ILO's constituents understood the performance of scientific
positivism as a means of producing truth. Technocratic neutrality's
persuasive appearance might be traced to the ILO's origins in the early
twentieth century modernist reform program of international labor
legislation, in which faith in the capacity of positivist science to
transcend political and economic divisions featured so prominently. It
might also be linked to the organization's more recent embrace of the
human rights framework, a system likewise embedded in a distinctly
modernist ontology of progress. 101
Yet, regardless of the source of this epistemic potency, it was the
careful marshaling and reassembling of information facilitated by
law-making
that
generated
the
technocratic
interventions
problematique within which policymaking and politics continues to

100. Telephone Interview with Jo Becker, supra note 82.
101. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 31, 72 (2012).
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unfold. The case study of the Domestic Workers Convention thus
presents a striking counter-example to studies that explore the role of
"new" governance techniques, such as cost-benefit calculation and
compliance review mechanisms, in furthering the current momentum
for deregulation. In the context of labor standard-setting, the devices
wielded by legal experts contributed not to further deregulation but
rather to the extension of important legal protections to vulnerable
home-based caregivers whose claims to labor protections have only
recently been incorporated into the global regime of labor governance.

